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1 Introduction
In recent times we have witnessed a number of economic and institutional changes leading to
increased competition in goods and services markets. Numerous sectors have been deregulated,
there has been an increase in economic integration of diﬀerent geographic blocks (NAFTA, EU)
and transportation and information transmission costs have been falling steadily. These are
all trends leading to more competition in product markets. During the same period, wage
inequality increased sharply, especially in the US and the UK. This rise in inequality has
generated a vast literature trying to explain its causes that has established two important facts,
namely that returns to skill have increased markedly and that a large fraction of the increase
in inequality has occurred within sector and even within skill groups. It is also suggested that
the increase has occurred through a change in the price of skills rather than through changes
in its relative supply (Blau and Kahn, 2004). Closer inspection provides reasons to suspect
that these trends are correlated. For instance, most of the increase in inequality in the US
and the UK occurred in the 1980s, which is precisely the period of large deregulations. And a
cross-country comparison suggests that the US and the UK are the countries with both higher
inequality and a higher degree of product market competition relative to France or Germany
for instance.
However, and in spite of their strength and economic relevance there has been little attempt
to link these very strong trends in the economy. The question addressed in this paper is
precisely to what extent changes in product market competition alter the behavior of labor
market actors and the wage structure; and whether we can we identify a causal mechanism
from product market competition to increasing returns to skill and wage inequality that is
consistent with recent trends.
The relationship between product market competition and labor market outcomes has long
been recognized, with imperfectly competitive industries generating higher monopoly rents and
thus the ability of firms to pay higher wages (Krueger and Summers, 19881). This mechanism
generates between-sector wage diﬀerentials for workers with the same skills. While the focus
of existing studies has been on the impact of product market competition on mean wages in
diﬀerent sectors, and on between-sector inequality, in this paper I will argue that the variance
of wages within sectors and, more generally, the whole within-sector wage distribution will also
be aﬀected as product market competition increases. In particular, returns to skill will change
1Evidence of this rent-sharing mechanism is provided in Card (1996) for airline industry deregulation in
the US, Revenga (1992) for international competition from import prices and Borjas and Ramey (1995) for
international competition in durable goods markets. Abowd and Lemieux (1993) instrument quasi-rents with
import prices in Canadian data and Van Reenen (1996) uses innovations as an instrument.
2
within sectors in response to competition. Product market competition will therefore have an
impact on the within-sector wage distribution over and above the strict rent sharing argument.
This paper establishes the causality between product market competition and returns to skill
and provides a theoretical illustration of why such a link might exist.
The theoretical mechanism proposed relies on the theoretical result that states that as
markets become more competitive the sensitivity of profits to costs is higher. This feature of
product market competition is common to most parametrizations of competition as will be
shown (Boone, 2002). If high-skill workers are capable of producing at lower costs, as product
market competition increases there will be stronger competition among firms to attract skilled
workers, thus raising their wages. It follows that returns to skill will be higher in sectors with
more product market competition; that is, the relative wage of a high to a low skill worker is
higher in more competitive sectors2.
The mechanism put forward also provides an explanation for within industry and within
skill wage inequality. What is rewarded are both the skills and the ability of workers, and
these may be observed by the worker and the employer but not by the econometrician. Under
this hypothesis there will be higher returns to both observed and unobserved skills within
industries.
The paper then explores empirically how product market competition actually relates to
the wage structure. It seeks to establish whether there is a causal eﬀect from increased product
market competition to increased returns to skill, its magnitude and economic relevance. To do
this in a convincing manner two diﬃculties must be overcome. The first is to find convincing
and exogenous sources of variation in the degree of product market competition. The second
is to be able to provide estimates that account for individual fixed eﬀects and that allow me
to provide estimates based on the “within” variation in returns to skill following exogenous
changes in competition. I am able to address these diﬃculties by exploiting the New Earning
Survey (1982-1999) which is a one percent random sample of the UK workforce (with full
employment histories where workers are followed as they change employers and sectors) to-
gether with three diﬀerent measures of product market competition including two quasi-natural
experiments that the UK economy underwent in the past twenty years.
The hypothesis that product market competition leads to changes in wage dispersion, is
first tested using a standard measure of product market competition, namely concentration
ratios. However, these ratios can be criticized from a conceptual point of view on the grounds
that they may not be perfect measures of competition and from an econometric point of view
2Other potential explanations for the existence of a link between competition and returns to skill (such as
the role of trade unions and other explanations for the increase in inequality) are discussed and addressed in
the empirical section.
3
because they may be correlated with an omitted variable and hence the estimates do not
capture the causal eﬀect of competition on changes in returns to skills.
I therefore turn to two alternative identification strategies that are better from the iden-
tification viewpoint to the extent that they represent arguably exogenous and uncontroversial
measures of increasing competition within sectors. These are based on two diﬀerent quasi-
natural experiments that aﬀected diﬀerent sectors in diﬀerent periods. The first corresponds
to the sharp appreciation of the British pound in 1996 that implied that sectors more open to
international trade experienced a larger increase in competition relative to fairly closed sec-
tors. The second quasi-natural experiment used is the implementation of the European Single
Market program in 1992 that I argue implied a bigger increase in competition for sectors with
high non-tariﬀ barriers prior to 1992. I provide diﬀerence in diﬀerences estimates of changes
in returns to skill following the changes in product market competition. Results in all the
specifications point to the fact that returns to skill increased after the increase in competition
from each of these sources and that actually wages for high skilled workers were higher as
a result of increased competition in some cases. The fact that the results are similar in all
cases, for diﬀerent sources of competition in diﬀerent time periods, indicates that the suggested
causal eﬀect of competition is empirically relevant.
The eﬀects of changes in competition on labor markets are likely to be numerous and
sizeable3. A nascent theoretical literature links product markets to labor markets in terms of
employment, wage levels and the joint regulation of the two (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003;
Amable and Gatti, 1997) however none outline the type of eﬀect of the level of competition
on the variance of wages within sectors outlined here4. A parallel eﬀect of product market
competition that is not dealt with here is its impact on the use of performance related pay.
Cuñat and Guadalupe (2003a) and (2003b) shows that increased product market competition
increases the sensitivity of pay to performance. This increase may also lead to increased
dispersion in wages and possibly in returns to skills (if skilled workers are those that perform
systematically better).
This paper should also be thought of taking into account existing explanations that have
3Other consequences of competition that are beyond the domain of this paper are its impact on employment
(Bertrand and Kramarz, 2001), on market value and innovation (Blundell et al., 1999; Aghion et al., 2002;
Nickell 1996 and Griﬃth, 2001) find empirical evidence of increased product market competition leading to in-
creased eﬀort exertion/eﬃciency. Bertrand (1999) argues that increased competition also alters the employment
relationship in that it brings it to a setting where contracts are increasingly dominated by the market at the
expense of implicit agreements where worker insurance against shocks was more relevant.
4OECD (2002) Employment Outlook actually note the lack of evidence on this subject and document a
negative cross country relationship between the index of product market liberalization and wage inequality, but
this can only be considered as exploratory evidence of the relationship.
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been put forward for the increase in wage inequality5, in particular skill-biased technical change,
international trade, organizational change (Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001; Black and Lynch,
2003; Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2003) and changes in unionization (Machin, 1997; Card,
2001). The eﬀect of competition probably coexists with these other explanations and it is
possible that changing product market competition also has an eﬀect on some of these changes,
however this paper is only concerned with the direct eﬀect of competition on wage dispersion
and explicitly attempts to partial out other direct eﬀects, leaving for future research additional
implications of such a link.
In the light of the existing literature, the contribution of the paper is twofold. Firstly I bring
product market structure to bear on the compensation structure and the wage distribution and
provide a theoretical reason for why competition may raise returns to skill and ability. Secondly,
I establish empirically that increased product market competition does indeed raise returns
to observed and unobserved skills within sectors and therefore within sector wage inequality.
The proposed mechanism therefore constitutes a reason for why inequality has increased in
the past decades in a way that is consistent with the established facts: that much of the
explained increase in inequality has taken the form of increased returns to skill, that inequality
has increased within sector and skill group and that it is the price of skills that has changed
over time.
The next section lays out the proposed theoretical mechanism for a link between competi-
tion and returns to skill. Section 3 describes the econometric specification and the identification
strategies used in the empirical analysis and section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The economic link between product market competition and
wages
The purpose of this section is to lay out the reasons why changes in product market competition
may aﬀect wage setting behavior and the wage distribution. I present a simple model that
illustrates why such a link may exist and underlines some properties of product markets when
firms are heterogeneous. The argument will be that as product market competition increases,
and even in the presence of competitive labor markets, firms will be willing to pay (relatively)
more to attract good workers and hence returns to skill will be higher and wage dispersion will
increase. As will be shown below the crucial assumption for this to be true is that profits6 are
5The papers in this area are too numerous to refer to. Important seminal contributions include Berman et
al. (1994), Juhn (1993) and more recently Autor et al. (1998). Katz and Autor (1999) provide a survey and
lay out the main issues.
6 In the model below the condition will be on revenues (profits gross of bargained wages w(di)).
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more sensitive to the ability of the worker hired, the higher is product market competition.
In that situation firms will be willing to pay more for high skilled workers and increase the
fraction of profits they share with them. This simple economic mechanism follows from the
two assumptions made throughout this paper: imperfect competition in product markets and
heterogeneity and imperfect substitutability of workers. The result is very general in that it
does not depend on the particularities of functional forms for competition assumed.
The story proposed relies on the enhanced cost cutting abilities of a high relative to a low
skilled worker and how much firms are willing to pay for this. However there are at least two
other stories for why competition may change returns to skill. If trade unions compress wages
whenever there are rents to share, the increase in competition may imply a fall in rents and
hence a reduction in the ability to compress wages. One might also think that the increase
in competition actually changes the form of production and raises the demand for managerial
positions relative to non-managerial ones. I will address these issues in the data and see to
what extent they are also part of the causal relationship between competition and wages. We
will see that although both play a role, the eﬀect of competition on wages is also present when
we control for union presence and when we restrict the analysis to sectors with low levels of
unionization and that the eﬀect is also at work within large occupational groups.
I now first turn to a simple illustration that captures the thrust of the theoretical result
used in this paper, that states that the sensitivity of profits to costs increases in the degree of
competition. Then I set up a more general case with more economic structure that lays out
the assumptions necessary and determines a suﬃcient condition under which an increase in
product market competition leads to an increase in returns to skill.
2.1 Simple illustration of a general result
To illustrate the fact that profits are more sensitive to costs the higher the degree of product
market competition, consider the following simple calculation. Let profits of firm i be
πi = (pi − di)Yi
where in standard notation pi is the price set by firm i, Yi is the firm’s output given some
exogenous production function and di are (exogenous) unit production costs that are assumed
to be decreasing in the ability of the worker hired. Using the envelope theorem one can show
that dπi/ddi = −Yiand the elasticity of profits with respect to di is ε = (di/πi)(dπi/ddi) =
−di/(pi−di). Note that (p−d)/d is the markup (Lerner index) that in turn reflects the level of
competition. Hence the sensitivity of profits to costs is higher the higher the competition level.
If high skill workers are those who are able to produce at lower costs, then the sensitivity of
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profits to skill increases in competition. This is the basic economic mechanism (coupled with
imperfect substitutability between workers) that supports the link between competition and
wage dispersion. In this situation high ability workers will extract more surplus in form of
wages when product market competition increases.
2.2 Formal setting
The purpose now is to identify a suﬃcient condition in a fairly general setting for increased
product market competition triggering increasing returns to skill, therefore what follows is a
simple and stylized model that is kept at a high level of generality.
Consider N firms selling goods in a non-competitive product market. Each firm hires one
worker such that the number of workers employed in the monopolistic sector is given by the
number of firms in that sector, N (that is determined by product market structure). Workers
that are not hired in the sector will be self employed and get some exogenous reservation wage
b. Product markets are not competitive but labor markets are perfectly competitive in the
sense that there are no restrictions on hiring, firing or mobility costs.
Workers are of diﬀerent skill levels. This skill is innate or acquired but given at some point
in time when the hiring decision emerges. A high skill level means that the worker is able to
produce at lower costs, i.e. that he is more productive. And workers of diﬀerent skills are not
substitutable. A way of reflecting this is that the worker’s job is to set up a machine. A worker
of ability di (where di is an inverse index of the skill level) sets the machine so that when
the machine produces Yi units of output, the unit costs are aﬀected by di. A high d means
that the worker produces at high costs and hence is of low skill. d is distributed between d1
(for the highest skill worker that produces at lowest cost) and dL, and no assumption is made
on whether there are more or fewer workers than firms in the monopolistic sector. What is
important is that the firms’ revenue function eπ(di, θ) (profit gross of wages) is increasing in
ability (in productivity). I thus assume that eπ is such that deπddi < 0.
The stages of the game are as follows. In the first stage N identical firms compete for
workers of diﬀerent abilities. They post a complete wage profile, that is a wage associated to
each skill level. Both firms and workers know perfectly the ability level of all workers and the
degree of competition. When they meet, firms oﬀer workers a given wage level and each worker
can accept or reject those oﬀers7.
Once workers are allocated to firms, production occurs and in the second stage firms com-
pete in the product market where they sell their products. The level of competition in the
7We could extend the model to allow for workers to be compensated per unit produced and the eﬀort exerted.
This is straightforward when we assume constant disutility of eﬀort where the disutility of eﬀort is precisely di.
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product market is also known throughout.
In equilibrium no firm will have an incentive to post a diﬀerent wage profile (Nash equilib-
rium). The game is solved backwards. In the second stage firms chose prices and/or quantities
(depending on the type of competition game played) that maximize gross profits eπ(di; θ) given
the level of competition θ. The resulting optimized eπ(di; θ) is a function of the ability of the
worker hired.
In the first stage firms take into account this gross profit function and compete for workers
through their wage oﬀers. Firms maximize net profits π(di; θ)8 (revenue net of wages) subject
to the participation constraint of workers according to which they will only accept a wage oﬀer
if it is above their reservation utility b and the wage that any other firm may oﬀer them.
maxπ(di; θ) = eπ(di; θ)− wF (di) (1)
s.t.wF (di) > min{wJ(di), b} for all J ∈ [1, N ]
Where b is the exogenous reservation wage and wJ is the wage oﬀered by any other firms.
For a given N, in equilibrium the N th firm that hires the N th ability worker (if we ranked
workers by ability level, the one at the N th position) pays him the reservation wage. This
yields profits for the N th firm given by: π(dN , θ) = eπN(dN)− b.
The optimal strategy for firm F is to oﬀer wF (di) to worker i such that in equilibrium it
could not make higher profits by paying wF and hiring a worker of diﬀerent ability dj , nor by
paying that ith worker a diﬀerent wage.
eπ(di)− wF (di) ≥ eπ(dj)− wF (dj), for all i, jeπ(di)− wF (di) ≥ eπ(di)− wJ(di), for all i, j (2)
Firms are identical, so a symmetric equilibrium gives wF (di) = wJ(di) = w(di), and the
above conditions collapse to:
eπ(di)−w(di) ≥ eπ(dj)− w(dj), for all i, j
In equilibrium all firms make equal profits:
eπ(di, θ)−w(di, θ) = eπ(dj , θ)− w(dj , θ) = eπN (dN , θ)− b (3)
w(di, θ) = eπ(di, θ)− eπN(dN , θ) + b (4)
In equilibrium (Nash) no firm will have an incentive to alter the wage profile oﬀered because
they cannot increase profits by doing so. If they lowered the wage of the worker hired, the
8Profits appear as a function of ability di and the competition level θ. Implicitly they are also a function of
quantity produced q(di, θ) which is already optimised as q∗(di, θ) when we write the profit function: π(di; θ) =
π(di, q∗(di, θ); θ)
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Figure 1: Equilibrium revenue and wage schedules
worker would leave and if they raised it they would be strictly worse oﬀ. In equilibrium all
firms are making equal profits and are indiﬀerent as to which worker they hire.
One can define two relevant schedules that are related as in equation (3). The revenue
schedule eπ(di, θ) and the optimal wage schedule w(di, θ). These are pictured in Figure (1) for
a given N . Note that dw(di,θ)ddi =
deπ(di,θ)
ddi
. This was assumed to be negative, i.e. revenue is
decreasing in costs - increasing in ability. I will show below that diﬀerent models of product
market competition do deliver the assumed negative slope in eπ. So the wage schedule is
decreasing in d and has the same slope as the revenue schedule but it is shifted down byeπN (dN , θ) + b. It has a lower bound given by b.
If N is such that firms enter until the last firm makes zero profits, then we have eπN (dN , θ)−
b = 0, and in equilibrium all other firms also make zero profits and wages are such that
w(di, θ) = eπ(di, θ).
So far I have not assumed any functional form for product market competition, just that θ
was the competition parameter9. All the assumptions required were that revenues eπ increase
in the ability of the worker hired, that each firm hires one worker and that the bargaining
process is as described above.
The next step is to see what is the suﬃcient condition in this setting for an increase in
competition triggering and increase in wage dispersion. This is:
d2w(di, θ)
ddidθ
=
d2eπ(di, θ)
ddidθ
< 0 (5)
Which is a single crossing condition.
9Note that it is possible that other features of product markets or technologies have similar eﬀects on profits,
and hence they will also imply increasing returns to skill. This is not studied here.
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Therefore, if the type of product market competition generates a profit function with the
properties outlined above, an increase in competition will trigger an increase in returns to
ability and wage dispersion. Since it can be argued that product market competition can take
diﬀerent forms in diﬀerent markets it is important to check whether the classical forms of
competition traditionally modelled satisfy the above property.
Boone (2000, 2002) is a crucial reference in relation to this analysis. It has been noted before
(especially in relation to the empirical analysis of competition) that the competition measures
traditionally used are non monotone in competition, and that their validity as measures of
competition depends highly on the competitive framework assumed, in particular when firms
are not symmetric. For example, it is diﬀerent whether the number of competitors increases
because entry costs fall (an increase in competition) or if it is because firms interact less
aggressively (a fall in competition). Boone (2002) finds that the common feature to a number
of models of competition with heterogenous costs is that the mapping of relative marginal
costs to relative profits (eπ in my model) increases with competition. The paper shows that
with heterogeneous costs, under a very large number of standard IO parametrizations this key
property holds. And this is precisely the suﬃcient condition required in this paper. If we
add to this feature bargaining over the surplus in the way I have outlined we obtain the main
prediction in this paper: that higher product market competition increases returns to skill and
wage dispersion10.
Figure (2) illustrates what happens when product market competition increases and the
condition above is satisfied for a given number of firms N . As θ changes, the gross profit
function becomes steeper. The wage schedule also shifts so that the vertical distance between
the two curves is constant, and the wage schedule is anchored at b for the N th worker hired.
The wage function becomes steeper and the ratio of high to low skill wages is higher. In the
picture we hold N fixed.
This property of eπ holds regardless of the type of competition we assume at the product
market stage. In the appendix I provide an illustration and show that it holds for the Dixit-
Stiglitz model of competition11.
10A related idea to the one in this paper is the winner-take-all concept or the idea of ”superstars”. Rosen
(1981) develops a theory of why small diﬀerences in skill can lead to large diﬀerence in wages as is seen with
the development of the idea of superstars. The argument is that the production of some workers has the
characteristics of a public good. This type of technology will imply that as the size of the market increases
(following reductions in transportation costs say) the superstar gets a large part of the market and his earnings
will increase relative to the person that is just below him in ability terms. Wage dispersion will be larger.
In my framework wage inequality increases without the need of the public good technology. What the public
good technology delivers is the extreme polarisation of earnings.
11A previous version of the paper also included the proof for Cournot competition with heterogeneous firms.
This is available from the author upon request.
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Figure 2: Comparative statics of a change in product market competition
I now turn to the empirical analysis of this economic relationship to assess its signific-
ance and quantitative importance. Next section describes the econometric specification and
identification strategy adopted.
3 Specification and identification strategy
The identification of the main eﬀect in this paper exploits the eﬀect of changes in product
market competition in diﬀerent sectors on the relative returns to skill over time based on
individual wage equations with UK data. Most of the analysis concerns returns to observed
skill level as proxied by the occupational distribution. However I will also say something on
the relationship between unobserved ability, competition and wage dispersion. The model in
the previous section predicts that the diﬀerence in wages between high and low skill workers
will be higher in more competitive sectors. Recall that this is independent of whether mean
wages are higher or lower in more competitive sectors as it is just a statement about relative
wages. So the parameter of interest is the diﬀerence in the returns to skill between the diﬀerent
skill groups as product market competition changes. As I will explain below the data used are
particularly well-suited for this analysis since it is a long individual panel of complete work
histories and employer-reported wage data.
One of the diﬃculties will be to find appropriate and convincing measures of product market
competition. The strategy followed will be to look at a number of diﬀerent measures. I will
start with standard concentration ratios and then exploit two natural experiments that implied
an increase in competition. This is explained below.
As has been widely documented elsewhere inequality has been increasing markedly in the
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UK over the past 20 to 30 years (Gosling et al., 2000). Figure 3 shows the evolution of the
diﬀerence in mean log wages between the highest and the lowest skill group in my data (males
in the manufacturing sector), with my skill group definitions. Inequality between skill groups
increased by 0.28 log points.
Figure 4 draws the evolution of top 5 concentration ratios measured by output and em-
ployment for the period 1982-1999 in the manufacturing sector in the UK. For some sectors
the measures of concentration have increased while for other sectors they fell which is good for
the identification since this is precisely the source of variation I will be exploiting to identify
skill diﬀerentials.
Figures 5 and 6 bring these two trends together and show the cross sectional and time series
relationship between competition (measured by concentration) and inequality. Figure 5 plots
wage dispersion (measured by the 90/10 diﬀerential in wages) by sector between 1982 and 1999
against average concentration by sector for those years. More concentrated sectors have lower
dispersion than more competitive sectors. Figure 6 plots dispersion by year against average
concentration by year, which again yields a negative relationship, i.e. over time concentration
fell and inequality increased.
Interestingly, a number of papers in the literature report either descriptive or related (be-
cause their focus is on a diﬀerent mechanism) evidence consistent with the results in this paper.
Card (1986, 1996a) and Hirsch and Macpherson (2000) report some evidence of increased wage
dispersion after the US airline deregulation. Black and Strahan (2001) look at the impact of
banking deregulation on wages and while they find that average wages fell after the deregu-
lation, their results also point to the fact that they fell more for low than high skill workers.
Hirsch (1993) and Rose (1987) look at the impact of trucking deregulation and find it increased
inequality although they argue that this was due to a fall in union strength. Finally, Fortin
and Lemieux (1997) assess the impact of a number of institutional changes in the US on the
wage distribution. Deregulation of major industries explains some of the eﬀect.
So there is some preliminary evidence in the literature and at the aggregate level of the
existence of a cross sectional and time series relationship between wage dispersion and product
market competition. The purpose of the remainder of the paper is to establish whether there
is evidence for a causal link between the two.
3.1 Basic model
Let’s suppose that the equation determining the log wage of individual i working in sector j
with skill level k at time t can be written as:
12
ln(wijkt) = α+ θkCjt +X
0
ijktγ + dt + dj + dk + vijkt (6)
vijkt = dkt + dkj + ηi + εijkt (7)
Where Cjt is competition in sector j at time t (in the empirical analysis I present evidence
on three diﬀerent measures of Cjt), Xijkt is a vector of individual characteristics (including
age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared and skill dummies), ηi is an unobserved permanent
individual component, time, sector and skill dummies are given by dt, dj and dk. dkt represents
fully interacted skill and time dummies and dkj are fully interacted skill and sector dummies.
εijkt is a white noise.
The estimate of returns to skill θk will reflect how returns to diﬀerent skill levels (k)
vary with product market concentration (in the actual estimation I will include skill dummies
interacted with Cjt in levels and drop the low skill level and competition interaction to avoid
collinearity). We are interested in the diﬀerential returns to skill in diﬀerent competitive
environments. In fact it is easier to see this as an interest in (θk1 − θk2) where k1 and k2 are
two diﬀerent skill levels.
The basic model estimated in equation (6) controls for heterogeneity at sector level and
for between sector diﬀerences in wages. It identifies θk out of the within sector variation in
competition over time and will be unbiased provided sector specific trends in returns to skills
are uncorrelated with competition.
However, the estimate of our parameter of interest will be biased if Cov(Cjt, vijkt) 6= 0.
Equation (9) identifies the potential sources of bias.
The first major source of bias is individual unobserved heterogeneity. For this purpose I
exploit the longitudinal character of my data and estimate an individual fixed eﬀects model.
This takes care of omitted variable bias that would result from Cov(Cjt, ηi) 6= 0, i.e. from
the individual permanent unobserved component being correlated with competition levels.
This could occur if there was sorting of workers with diﬀerent skill levels into sectors with
diﬀerent levels of competition. In practice, if the composition of workers within a sector
changes with the degree of product market competition it becomes important to control for
individual fixed eﬀects. Table 4 shows regressions of the logarithm of sectoral employment on
the three competition variables used in this paper, plus sector and year dummies. The results
indicate that the increase in competition led to larger employment falls in sectors more aﬀected
by the exchange rate appreciation and the SMP (with no significant eﬀects of competition
measured by concentration). This indicates that the composition of sectors may be changing
and hence it is important to control for individual fixed eﬀects. Note that the NES, is ideal
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for this exercise because it is a longer panel than most usually available providing considerable
“within” variation to identify the main eﬀects out of individual behavior. Furthermore I
am able to distinguish between the identification coming from stayers and that arising from
individuals changing sectors by allowing for sector specific individual fixed eﬀects (where the
identification is strictly from within sector changes in competition -from stayers) and comparing
the estimates to the standard individual eﬀects results (that identify out of movers and stayers).
The second source of bias would arise from a correlation between Cjt and dkj , that is
between sector specific returns to skill and competition. I include skill and sector specific
dummies in the regression to capture this. If we omitted this set of interactions, the results
would be biased only if the wage diﬀerential between two skill groups varies by sector and this
variation is correlated with competition. This could arise for instance through a trade union
eﬀect if trade unions are stronger in sectors with less competition implying that wages are
more compressed in those sectors.
I also introduce fully interacted skill and year dummies that capture any trend or time
variation in returns to the diﬀerent skills. The most immediate example of this would be skill
biased technical change. There is a large literature on this issue and skill biased technical
change is thought to be one of the main culprits for the increase in wage inequality in the UK
and the US12. If returns to skill are increasing over time (due to skill biased technical change
or any other reason) in a way that is correlated with competition, we may capture a spurious
relationship in our coeﬃcient of interest. This is taken account of in the skill and year dummies
interaction.
Note that accounting for the terms in the error term equation in a fully unrestricted way
leads to a highly saturated model of wages. The drawback is a loss in eﬃciency from the large
number of dummy variables included in the regression and that the “within” variation will be
lower.
Although the variation exploited to assess the eﬀect of product market competition on
wage dispersion is at the level of sector and time, I exploit the individual panel for two main
reasons. One is that in this way I can control for compositional changes in the sectors over
time. If the tenure, skill, age or ability structure of a particular sector varies over time this
will be accounted for by using individual records. Second, some individuals will be changing
jobs and sectors and this constitutes highly informative variation since the fact that we have
movers allows us to compare the diﬀerent returns to skills of the same individual in sectors
with diﬀerent levels of competition13. The standard errors will be adjusted where necessary to
12Although see Card and DiNardo (2002).
13Some individuals will experience skill upgrading because as we will see the measure of skill used is based
on the occupational classification. To confirm that we can interpret the results as returns to skill I will also
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account for the fact that the correlation between the measures of competition of two diﬀerent
individuals in the same sector is non-zero (Moulton, 1986).
However, even in the most saturated specification there are a number of objections to
the results that one could come up with. The first and simplest is whether one believes
the measure of product market competition used. There are numerous discussions in the
Industrial Organization literature on the nature of product market competition, how it should
be measured and what diﬀerent commonly used measures capture. In the first part of the
empirical analysis I use the top 5 concentration ratio. This is a standard and commonly used
measure of competition and a good starting point for the analysis. Still, since it may only be an
imperfect measure of the true level of competition the next step in the analysis is to find other
uncontroversial and exogenous measures of changing competition. These will be the natural
experiments developed in what follows. The natural experiments used are clear measures of
increasing competition that furthermore cover diﬀerent periods and aﬀect diﬀerent sectors and
where the source of competition is diﬀerent in each case.
The second objection is that the concentration measure used may still be correlated with
some variable Wjt that also determines returns to skills. These could be the standard ex-
planations for increasing inequality in the literature such as skill biased technological change,
international trade, falling unionization and changes in institutions. In these circumstances, a
natural way out is again provided by the use of natural experiments since these are exogenous
changes in product market competition and the causal mechanism is clearly identified. This
exogeneity is what allows us to get at an estimate of the causal eﬀect of competition.
3.2 First quasi-natural experiment: trade openness and the 1996 appreci-
ation
The first source of exogenous variation in competition I exploit is based on the UK being a small
open economy and the fact that fluctuations in the exchange rate are largely unpredictable
and exogenous to the wage setting conditions within the country. Hence, sharp and sudden
changes in the pound sterling can be considered as a quasi-natural experiment.
The sharp appreciation of the pound sterling in 1996 (see Figure 7) can be used as an
exogenous shock that aﬀected sectors diﬀerently depending on their openness to trade. I use
import penetration as my measure of openness (imports divided by the sum of imports and
total sector product). The identification assumes that the appreciation was strictly exogenous
and could not be forecasted by firms in the UK.
run quantile regressions within skill groups and show that the distribution of wages changes and that returns
to skill increase with competition also within occupational groups.
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The idea is that the change in the exchange rate aﬀected more deeply sectors that were
relatively open before 1996. Its direct eﬀect was to reduce the prices that foreign competitors
could oﬀer in the UK market. Another way of seeing it is that it actually reduced the costs
of foreign firms relative to UK costs and the reduction in costs has an eﬀect on equilibrium
prices that reflects the extent of the increase in competition. Dornbusch (1987) develops this
argument and shows that under the Cournot, Dixit-Stiglitz and Salop models of competition,
as the domestic currency appreciates, the relative costs of domestic firms increase, domestic
prices fall, and they do more so in sectors with high import penetration. So the immediate
eﬀect of a depreciation will have a bigger impact on prices in sectors with high levels of import
penetration. In this situation, high cost domestic firms are more likely to go bankrupt and in
general it increases the pressure on domestic sectors where import penetration is important14.
So sectors with high import penetration will face a larger increase in competition after the
appreciation of the pound and hence the wage diﬀerential of high to low skill workers should
increase more in those sectors after 1996 than in the least open and low trading sectors15.
I first assess whether the appreciation implied a larger increase in returns to skill in highly
open sectors. For this purpose I estimate:
lnwijkt = α+ γXijkt + δk(postt ∗ impenetrj) + dt + dj + dk + ηi + εijkt
where postt is a dummy variable that takes value one in the second period (post 96),
impenetrj is import penetration for sector j. Note that since openness may change endogen-
ously with the exchange rate change, import penetration is computed as the average import
penetration measure over the years 1993 to 1995. It therefore only varies by j. The rest are
defined as before.
However, to exploit the fact that we can exploit the diﬀerential eﬀect that the experiment
had on diﬀerent sectors, I also estimate the diﬀerential change in returns to skill pre and post
appreciation for sectors with diﬀerent degrees of openness. This is like a diﬀerence in diﬀerences
estimate of returns to skill. The estimated diﬀerence in diﬀerences specification is:
lnwijkt = γXijkt+ δk(postt ∗ impenetrj)+dt+dj +dk+λ0k ∗ postt+λ1k ∗ impenetrj + ηi+ εijkt
In this specification λ0k captures the diﬀerential returns to skill before and after the change
in the exchange rate and λ1k captures the diﬀerences in returns to skill between sectors with
14Beyond these immediate eﬀects on competition via relative costs and prices, several papers examine the
theoretical relationship between structural changes in competition and exchange rates. In particular Baldwin
(1988), Baldwin and Krugman (1989) show that a large appreciation may reshape the competitive structure of
the local market in a permanent way.
15Articles that use similar eﬀects of exchange rate fluctuations on imports as measures of competition include
Revenga (1992) and Bertrand (1999).
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diﬀerent degrees of import penetration. These are necessary to obtain a diﬀerence in diﬀerences
estimate of the returns to skill δk.
I also address explicitly the role of changing unionization in the whole process. This is done
by controlling for union density in the sector and by restricting the sample to sectors with low
unionization. Finally, standard errors are clustered at sector level which accounts for potential
autocorrelation within the treatment groups.
3.3 Second quasi-natural experiment: the 1992 European Single Market
Program (SMP)
The European Single Market Program was designed to allow for the free movement of goods,
services, capital and labor in the European Union. In a 1985 White Paper, the Commission
devised a number of measures (300) aimed at achieving this. The actual implementation of
the measures was staged between 1988 and 1992.
The White paper designed measures to eliminate barriers to the development of a unique
internal market arising from: physical controls at the frontiers, technical rules, regulations
and standards, public procurement policies, diﬀerences in fiscal structures and restraints on
the movement of labor and capital. The channels through which the SMP was expected to
operate were the following: reducing transaction costs, lowering barriers which enabled firms to
segment markets, removing the means through which national governments can discriminate
in favor of its firms, reducing costs of capital and labor (increasing mobility), assisting the
process of structural change by investing in infrastructure, technology and skills.
To exploit the exogenous variation in competition generated by the introduction of the
SMP I use the fact that diﬀerent industries had diﬀerent levels of non-tariﬀ barriers in place
before the SMP implementation. I use the same classification and time periods as Griﬃth
(2001)16. This is derived from Mayes and Hart (1994). They divide industries depending on
whether they had low, medium or high non-tariﬀ barriers prior to the SMP. It was expected
that the introduction of the SMP would aﬀect more those with medium or high barriers that
would see these considerably reduced. The classification is at 3 digit SIC and as Griﬃth (2001)
I will consider those with medium or high barriers previous to the development of the single
market as the sectors for which competition increased more sharply; and given the measures
were designed to be implemented between 1988 and 1992 I will consider two time periods -
before and after 1992; and two groups of sectors - those most and least aﬀected by the SMP.
Below, I provide evidence for the validity of the SMP as an indicator of product market
competition by looking at whether it aﬀected diﬀerently what we call high and low sensitivity
16This experiment is also used in Aghion et al. (2003).
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sectors before and after 1992.
Identification comes from the diﬀerential eﬀect that the SMP had on sensitive (aﬀected)
and non-sensitive (non-aﬀected) industries depending on their level of non-tariﬀ barriers and
hence is a diﬀerence in diﬀerences estimator of returns to skill.
The specification I estimate is
lnwijkt = α+γXijkt+δk(post92t∗sensitivejt)+dt+dj+dk+λ0k∗post92t+λ1k∗sensitivejt+ηi+εijkt
where now the interaction (post92t ∗ sensitivejt) is a dummy that takes value one for
sensitive/aﬀected sectors after 1992, t = pre92, post92 and j = sensitive, nonsensitive. The
rest are defined as before.
In this specification λ0k captures the diﬀerential returns to skill before and after the SMP
implementation in 1992 and λ1k captures the diﬀerences in returns to skill between aﬀected
and non aﬀected sectors. As before, these are necessary to obtain a diﬀerence in diﬀerences
estimate of the returns to skill δk. I also provide the diﬀerence results and results restricted to
the low unionization sample. Standard errors are clustered by sector.
3.4 Returns to unobserved ability
In the basic specification that uses concentration ratios I estimate the returns to observed
skill interacted with competition. However, it is also interesting to find out whether returns to
unobserved ability are higher in more competitive sectors. The story would then also provide an
explanation of within skill and sector changes in wage inequality. The existing literature points
out that a large fraction of the increase in overall inequality cannot be explained by sector and
skill diﬀerences. Product market competition may be a potential explanatory variable for that
aspect of wage inequality.
One can argue that the best measure of the ability of a worker is the wage he receives (as
in Card, 1996b). We can then potentially rank workers according to their predicted wages.
Taking diﬀerent percentiles as the skill groups, quantile regressions at diﬀerent quantiles yield
a measure of returns to skill as a function of the measure of competition. I run the following
quantile regressions for a number of quantiles q :
ln(wijkt) = δ
qCjt + γ
qXijkt + d
q
k + d
q
j + d
q
t + vijkt
Where the variables are defined as before. If the dispersion of wages is increasing in competition
conditional on all the covariates included we should obtain that bδq > cδq0 for q > q017. This
17 In the case Cjt measures concentration as in the data this would be | bδq| >d|δq0 | for q > q0.
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would indicate that as competition increases high skilled workers are relatively more highly
rewarded.
4 Estimates of the impact of competition on the wage structure
4.1 The Data
To assess the link between product market competition and relative wages I use the New
Earnings Survey (NES) and a number of diﬀerent sources for the competition measures and
the natural experiments.
The NES is a very large sample survey of 1% of all individuals employed in the U.K.
Employers are bound by law to provide directly information on all individuals whose national
insurance number ends in two given digits. These individuals constitute the NES sample that
has a number of characteristics that make it ideal for this study. Since NI numbers are issued
randomly to individuals and are retained for life we have a very long panel with a random
sample of workers with complete employment histories. It contains very detailed (employer
reported) data on earnings and hours worked. The records correspond to a specific week in
April for each year and are available from 1975 to 1999. The data contain information on
weekly and hourly wages, on hours and overtime hours worked and also on age, occupation,
region, industry and whether or not the individual was in the same job on the previous year.
The sample is restricted to males working full time and whose pay has not been aﬀected by
absence in the reference week. The observable skill variable is derived from the occupational
data. I obtain three skill groups (high medium and low skill) along the lines suggested by Elias
(1995) and shown in Table 1.
The advantage of using the NES over other datasets for this purpose is that it is a very long
panel that follows individuals throughout their working lives so it provides enough individual
variation for longitudinal, within individual analysis. Furthermore it provides very accurate
hourly measures of wages such that one can isolate hourly wages excluding overtime, and
abstract from the changes in hours worked. Finally it is a very large sample that contains
observations from all economic sectors.
The measure of wages used is real weekly pay of workers whose pay was not aﬀected by
absence excluding over-time pay divided by weekly hours excluding over-time hours.
To estimate the role played by standard competition measures in the wage equations I
originally obtained concentration measures from the UK Oﬃce of National Statistics (ONS)
based on the ARD dataset18. The results presented here correspond to the top 5 concentration
18The ARD is the establishment level data that is collected under the Annual Census of Production in the
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ratio measured by employment. This is a measure of concentration that reflects the percentage
of total employment in the sector accounted for by its five largest firms. The sample used
to compute this concentration ratio (CR5) was the actual population of UK manufacturing
firms19. This dataset has the advantage that it goes back to 1982 but restricts the analysis to
the manufacturing sector (SIC 1992 codes from 151 to 372).
Trade data are used in the second part of the empirical section. These were obtained from
the ‘Imports and Exports data: MQ10 dataset’, elaborated by the ONS20 that provides imports
and exports at current prices by three digit SIC92 (in million pounds) and seasonally adjusted
derived from the balance of payments. The data are available yearly from 1990. To construct
import penetration (imports divided by imports plus sector output), I use total production
from the ARD/ONS dataset previously mentioned.
To assess the eﬀect of the single market program (SMP) I define two groups of industries in
the NES depending on their degree of sensitivity to the program and following the classification
in Griﬃth (2001). Industries are defined by their SIC80 3-digit code.
Finally, I obtain measures of union density by sector from the Labor Force Survey. Un-
fortunately one can only construct a consistent measure of unionization since 1994, and I am
only able to control for unions from that date. I also generate a low unionization sample given
by sectors that in 1994 were below 10% unionization.
The analysis is done on three slightly diﬀerent subsections of the data because of limita-
tions in the process of merging the datasets that cover diﬀerent time periods. I deliberately
chose to keep the three subgroups diﬀerent instead of restricting the analysis to one homogen-
eous subgroup by dropping observations. The sample size for the basic specification contains
449562 observations representing 83002 individuals. It contains male workers in manufacturing
industries (SIC 151 to SIC 372) for the years 1982 to 1999. In the exchange rate experiment,
the analysis is done on the manufacturing sector for the years 1992 to 1999. Finally the SMP
analysis is for the whole period 1982-1999 but is limited by the definition of the aﬀected sectors
and the fact that they are defined with the SIC80 classification. The three samples do not
diﬀer substantially in terms of descriptive statistics and the descriptive statistics for the basic
specification can be found in Table 2.
UK.
19This measure is better computed than concentration measured by output and therefore less subject to meas-
urement error, that is why I decided to use it throughout the paper. The results for top 5 output concentration
were qualitatively similar to the ones using employment concentration. Table 3 shows the correlation between
the two measures (0.92) and indicates that their distribution is very similar.
20Available online on the ONS website.
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4.2 Results
This section seeks to provide a picture of how competition in the product market relates to the
wage structure, and how returns to skill change with changes in competition. The model in
Section 2 provided an explanation for why one might observe a link, however in the empirical
analysis once I establish the causal link I will consider other explanations. For this purpose I
will use three diﬀerent measures of competition to try and confirm the robustness and generality
of the mechanism identified. However when we go from the theory to the empirical testing a
number of comments are in order and a series of other mechanisms must be accounted for.
First, one must account for the possible presence of interindustry wage diﬀerentials. This
should mean that sectors with more competition will pay lower wages on average. This is a
diﬀerent problem from whether the returns to skills are higher or lower in more competitive
sectors. But the two eﬀects interact. Even if returns to skill are higher in more competitive
sectors, it may well be that even for that high skilled worker wages are lower than in non-
competitive sectors (from the fall in rents). This is important when we think about possible
selection issues since it is not clear that even though able workers will reap higher relative
rewards in more competitive sectors (a change in the slope), since their wages may be lower
there (a change in the level of wages for all skill levels from the fall in rents), it does not neces-
sarily follow that good workers will end up in more competitive sectors. The only unambiguous
statement one can make is on relative wages within sectors.
Second, note that provided skills are not fully transferable between sectors (if there is
a cost of changing sector or if the worker is less productive in another sector than in the
sector of origin), it will be sectoral variation in competition what matters for individual wages.
Workers consider their sector as the relevant labor market and only very large swings in product
market competition will make it worthwhile to change sectors. That is why sectoral variation
in competition is exploited here.
I will address both issues by comparing the specification with individual fixed eﬀects (where
the eﬀect is identified out of the within sector variation in competition) and the specification
with sector specific individual fixed eﬀects (that exploits only within sector and individual
variation in competition). In this way I will get at the eﬀect of the pure within sector change
in competition on relative wages.
Finally, as was stated before there are a number of reasons why product market competition
may have a direct eﬀect on relative wages. One story is the one developed in section 2 that
says that firms will be more willing to pay for the cost-cutting ability of high skilled workers.
Other stories include the role of trade unions in compressing wages and rent sharing. I will
address the empirical relevance of alternative stories in the data.
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4.2.1 Eﬀect of competition measured by concentration ratios
Table 6 presents the results for concentration ratios as the measure of competition. The
dependent variable is log real hourly wages. The coeﬃcients of interest are those on the
interaction between the medium and high skill variables with sectoral concentration. The
results show that as concentration falls (competition increases) the relative wages of the high
skilled go up, ceteris paribus. So there will be more wage compression in sectors with low
competition.
Column 1 shows the results for the pooled specification with sector fixed eﬀects (without
individual eﬀects). A change from the 75th (0.3) to the 25th (0.085) percentile in CR5 raises
the diﬀerence between high and low skill wages by 0.03 log points (the observed increase in
wage diﬀerentials between high and low skilled workers in the sample is 0.28 log points).
However, the identification in column 1 does not take into account the fact that the perman-
ent unobserved component of wages may be related to changes in competition, in particular
as workers are sorted between sectors and does not exploit the individual variation in wages
for that matter. This is addressed in the following columns.
Columns (2) to (7) are all individual fixed eﬀects specifications and progressively include
sector dummies, fully interacted time and skill dummies and fully interacted sector (at 2
digit SIC) and skill dummies. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on sector and year.
Hausman tests of random versus fixed eﬀects rejected the null of absence of correlation between
the error term and the regressors.
The coeﬃcients of interest on the interaction of the skill variables with sectoral concen-
tration show again that when competition increases the gap between high and low skill wages
is higher, ceteris paribus. As for the magnitude of the eﬀect, estimated coeﬃcients are (in
absolute value) lower than in the pooled observations specification.
Columns (3), (4) and (5) have respectively individual eﬀects, sector specific individual
eﬀects and firm specific individual eﬀects. By comparing the results in these specifications we
can assess how much of the estimated coeﬃcient results from workers changing sectors or firms
within a sector. The results indicate that seventy percent of the eﬀect is due to within sector
changes in competition, and thirty percent is actually due to wages changing within firms as
competition changes. As for the between sector changes (from sector movers), it seems that
high skilled workers do move to sectors with less concentration.
Column (6), takes into account the fact that returns to skills have been increasing economy-
wide over time for other reasons such as skill biased technical change by controlling in a non-
restricted way for changes in returns to skills over time. The coeﬃcient on returns to being
high skilled falls to -0.05. Finally, column (7) accounts for the fact that some sectors may have
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systematically higher returns to skill (for instance because of diﬀerent union presence), by
introducing fully interacted sector and skill dummies. Note though, that if CR5 is persistent
within sectors this will absorb much of the variation in returns to skills, and this may be one
reason for the coeﬃcient falling. In fact the coeﬃcient on CR5*medium skill is -0.36 and the
one on CR5*high skill is now -0.022 (both are significant although not statistically significantly
diﬀerent from each other). So even in this fully saturated specification, it appears that returns
to skills are increasing within sector with product market competition.
Notice that in the individual fixed eﬀects regression without sector dummies (column 2),
I find that more concentrated sectors pay higher wages as would be predicted by the inter-
industry wage diﬀerentials story. However, as soon as one includes sector dummies and the
individual fixed eﬀects, the eﬀect is negative and significant. This result has been found
elsewhere in the literature21, however mine was only a statement about relative wages, and the
result is confirmed.
Finally, a diﬀerent way of assessing the greater dispersion in wages resulting from increased
product market competition and diﬀerential returns to skills is using quantile regressions.
If wages are the best indicator of both observed and unobserved skill then we can assess
the eﬀect of competition on wage/skills at diﬀerent percentiles conditional on the covariates.
Furthermore, since my skill variable is based on the occupational classification, one could argue
that diﬀerent occupations do diﬀerent things and it is not clear whether comparing their relative
wages is the appropriate thing to do. To address this issue I present quantile regressions for
each skill group. The coeﬃcients will reflect the returns to overall skills within the observed
skill groups and conditional on age, tenure, their squares, year and sector dummies. Table
7 presents the results for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th quantiles. The coeﬃcient on
the concentration variable has a decreasing pattern within the three skill groups that seems
to accelerate at the 75th and 90th quantiles. The fact that it is larger in absolute value
for the high percentiles indicates again that the returns to being in a competitive sector are
higher for high wage/skill workers, and that returns to skill are increasing in product market
competition once we have conditioned on individual characteristics, sector and year (note I
have also conditioned on skill, so this is within observable skill diﬀerential returns). The last
panel of Table 7 presents similar results for the three pooled groups.
The previous results indicate that falling concentration is associated with increasing returns
to skills under a number of diﬀerent specifications. At this point and as was mentioned above,
21The most frequent explanation for this result has been that concentration is a poor measure of competition.
However in a model with heterogeneous costs of production it is possible for instance that as product market
competition increases, ineﬃcient firms drop out of the market, low skilled workers are laid oﬀ and average
profits (and wages) of the remaining actors are higher (Aghion and Shankerman, 1999).
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there are a number of reasons why we might want to have a strictly exogenous measure of
changes in competition to test the basic relationship. First, concentration may be criticized
as a highly imperfect measure of product market competition. Second, it is still possible that
concentration is correlated with another variable that also varies by sector and time and that
determines wage dispersion, so it is harder to establish the causal eﬀect. To account for this
I explore two diﬀerent exogenous sources of variation. The 1996 appreciation of the British
pound and the introduction of the European Single Market Program.
4.2.2 Exchange rate changes: the 1996 appreciation
The 1996 appreciation of the pound implied an exogenous increase in competition that should
aﬀect more sectors that are more open to foreign trade, that is sectors where imports represent
a large fraction of total sales. In practice, the appreciation meant that foreign firms could sell
at lower prices in the British market and hence competition for national firms was higher. I use
this exogenous increase and compare the behavior of the diﬀerent sectors in their wage setting
behavior before and after 1996 as a function of their openness. Figure 7 shows the evolution
of the British pound eﬀective exchange rate. Two diﬀerent regimes of low and high exchange
rate before and after 1996 are apparent.
The appreciation generated a significant shock on UK exports and imports. Table 8 shows
the aggregate eﬀect on the balance of trade of goods. In 1997 there is a small positive eﬀect on
the balance of trade. This is a natural eﬀect if there is some inertia on the quantities exported
and imported; the appreciation meant higher export prices and lower import prices, so the
balance of payments can initially improve. However from 1998 onwards the quantity eﬀect
dominates and the balance of trade nearly doubled its previous deficit. It is striking that in
spite of the appreciation of the pound by almost 20% the value of imports still went slightly
up after the appreciation. Gagnon (2003) estimates that UK firms absorbed about 40% of the
impact by reducing their prices. The rest of the impact was absorbed by quantities. The paper
also finds that and that profitability fell more in trading sectors. This is indirect evidence that
the appreciation did have an eﬀect on competition. I also tested for the presence of pre-existing
diﬀerential trends in returns to skills prior to 1992. No significant pattern was found which
confirms the validity of the experiment as an exogenous shock to competition and that the
results found are not spuriously just the result of pre-existing trends in returns to skill.
The estimates in Table 9 use the appreciation as the exogenous change in competition.
Columns 1 and 2 present the diﬀerence results. High skilled workers experienced larger wage
increases after the appreciation the more open their sector was. The eﬀect at average openness
was 4%. Column 2 controls for sector specific individual fixed eﬀects and confirms that the
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eﬀect arises from within sector changes in competition. Notice that now the within sector eﬀect
is negative, so that high skilled workers that move to a more competitive sector experience a
reduction in relative wages.
However columns 1 and 2 do not take account of the fact that highly exposed sectors may
have had higher returns to skills to start with or that after 1996 returns to skill were increasing
throughout the economy. Columns 3 to 5 deal with this as they are diﬀerence in diﬀerences
specifications for the returns to skill (with openness a continuous variable). Column 3 does
not control for individual fixed eﬀects and this has a very large eﬀect on the estimates since
in that case the eﬀect of competition is not significant. This indicates that there is sorting
along the competition dimension in this setting. This is less strong for the other measures of
competition where not accounting for individual eﬀects alters the coeﬃcients, but their sign
and statistical significance is maintained.
Columns 4 and 5 show that controlling for individual (and sector specific individual) fixed
eﬀects in a diﬀerence in diﬀerences specification there is a direct impact of this exogenous
measure of competition on returns to skill. At average openness the eﬀect was to increase
returns to skill by 0.02 log points.
However, one could argue that something else is driving the results, and that actually the
increase in competition is reflecting an indirect eﬀect through some other variable, the natural
candidate being unionization. If as product market competition increases unions are less able
to compress wages all I may be capturing is a union eﬀect. To address this issue I include
in table 10 a variable for the degree of union density in the sector (available from 1994) and
allow it to interact with the skill dummies to capture that changing unionization may alter
the degree of wage compression. Controlling for unionization, and for the degree of wage
compression implied by union presence the result on the impact of competition still holds and
is of the same magnitude as before. The coeﬃcient on the density variable and its interactions
indicate that sectors with more union density have lower returns to skill, and therefore that
unions tend to compress wages (Card, 1996b).
A further way to address the same issue is to restrict the sample to sectors with low
unionization (below 10% density in 1994). In this sample, wage compression through unions
will not be at work. This is done in columns 3 and 4. Again in column 3 the diﬀerence
estimator indicates that even in low unionized sectors the eﬀect of competition on returns to
skill was at work. Also in the diﬀerence in diﬀerences specification in column 4 the eﬀect has
the expected sign and it is large and significant which indicates that returns to skill increased
more after the appreciation in sectors that were more exposed to it, even when we restrict
the sample to sectors where changes in union wage compression cannot be driving the results.
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Therefore even though changes in the degree of wage compression by unions may be part of the
explanation for a causal eﬀect of competition on returns to skill, it cannot be the only one22.
4.2.3 The 1992 European Single Market Program
The introduction of the SMP implied a larger increase in product market competition for sectors
with high non-tariﬀ barriers prior to 1992. To test the impact and validity of the program
as an indicator of product market competition one can look at whether it aﬀected diﬀerently
what we call high and low sensitivity sectors before and after 1992. For this purpose I regress
concentration ratios by sector (3-digit SIC80) on a set of time and industry dummies and the
interaction of the SMP group (a dummy variable that equals one if the sector is classified as
having moderate or high barriers previous to SMP) and the post-92 period (the period covered
is 1982-1999).This is shown on Table 12. Employment top 5 concentration ratios fell by 3.3%
more in sensitive sectors post-SMP than in the sectors that were expected to be least aﬀected.
Griﬃth (2001) who also uses this experiment, is able to test directly (using the ARD database)
the eﬀect of the SMP program on firm level rents, measured by the Lerner index. She finds
that the Lerner index fell 1% more in sensitive sectors. This combined evidence indicates that
the experiment is a good measure for diﬀerential changes in competitive pressure23.
Table 11 presents individual fixed eﬀects regressions of log wages on the same individual
characteristics as before and an interaction of the experiment variable (that takes value one
for sensitive sectors post-92 and zero elsewhere) and the skill levels.
The coeﬃcient on returns to high skill in the first column is 0.097 implying that after
the SMP introduction, returns to skill increased by 10% in sensitive sectors, i.e. those who
experienced a larger increase in competition. Column 2 includes sector specific individual
eﬀects and indicates that most (80%) of the estimated change occurs within sectors. Column
3 shows the diﬀerence in diﬀerences estimate of returns to skill. Again, the coeﬃcient (0.018)
is reduced with respect to the one in the first column but is still statistically significant, and
the results confirm that in sectors more aﬀected by the SMP, i.e. where competition increased
22 In addition to the 1996 appreciation, a sizeable devaluation took place in 1992 that actually forced the Pound
out of the European Monetary System. The size of the devaluation is considerably lower than the appreciation
as can be seen from Figure 7. I estimated the eﬀect of that devaluationon returns to skill by running identical
regressions to the previous ones but where import penetration was computed as the average in 1990-1992 and
the treatment period was 1993 to 1996. The devaluation implied a larger fall in competition for sectors with
high levels of import penetration. The results on returns to skill were negative (returns to skill fell by more
in sectors with high import penetration), however the estimated coeﬃcients were not significant. This may be
due to the fact that the 1992 depreciation was smaller than the 1996 appreciation in size but in any case it is
relatively positive evidence on the main causal eﬀect found in this paper.
23As with the 1996 experiment, I also tested for the presence of pre-existing diﬀerential trends in returns to
skills prior to 1996. Again no significant pattern was found which confirms the validity of the experiment.
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most, the relative wage of high to low skilled workers increased by more. Note also that
the coeﬃcient on the interaction between skill and the sensitive sector dummy is negative. If
sensitive sectors are precisely those where product market competition was lower, this supports
the idea that returns to skill are higher in more competitive sectors. The diﬀerence of high
skill to low skill log wages after 1992 increased by almost 2% more in the more aﬀected than
in the less aﬀected industries.
I address the issue of unionization in Table 12 by restricting the sample to sectors with
union density lower than 10% in 199424. For this group, column 1 shows that after the SMP
returns to high skill were 5% higher in the sensitive sectors. When one controls for pre-existing
diﬀerential returns between the two groups and for the change in returns to skill throughout
all sectors after 1992, the diﬀerence in diﬀerences coeﬃcient on returns to skill is still positive
but becomes non-significant for high skill; it is still positive and significant for medium skills.
So the evidence is again suggestive of the same eﬀect on returns to skill, even at low levels of
unionization, and the role played by unions is much larger here.
Finally, I use quantile regressions to assess whether the greater dispersion in wages result-
ing from increased product market competition due to the SMP reflects in increasing returns
to unobserved skills even within skill groups. Table 13 presents the results for each skill group
for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th quantiles. The coeﬃcient on the experiment variable
(SENSAFT) has an increasing pattern in all skill groups which indicates that the returns to
being in a competitive sector are higher for high wage/skill workers, and that returns to skill
(both observable and unobservable) are increasing in product market competition once we have
conditioned on individual characteristics, sector and year. The magnitude of the eﬀect is actu-
ally greatest at the higher quantiles of the distribution. After 1992, the 90/10 wage diﬀerential
increased more in the sensitive sectors: by 1% more for the low skill category, 3% more for the
high skill category. If we restrict to the low unionization sample, the same type of eﬀect goes
trough with returns to skill increasing in the degree of competition. Finally, given the skill
measure was based on the occupational classification, this also addresses the issue of whether
what I am capturing is increasing returns to being in a managerial position or increasing re-
turns to skill. The fact that quantile regressions show an eﬀect in the overall distribution and
also when looking at the eﬀect of competition within broad skill groups indicates that skills
are indeed more highly rewarded in relative terms as competition increases.
24Yearly data on union density are only available from 1994 and hence I cannot control directly for the degree
of unionisation here. That is why I only present evidence on the restricted sample of low unionisation sectors.
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4.2.4 Contribution to changes in wage inequality
The analysis above indicates that product market competition increases returns to skill. One
would now want to have a sense of the size of the eﬀect. One diﬃculty with this is that
competition will be changing through diﬀerent channels and each of the measures used here only
identifies one channel at a time. Furthermore, the previous estimation focused on obtaining
diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimates, so they reflect ”how much more” returns to skill increased in
some sectors relative to others, controlling for a number of observables as well as unobserved
ability. Therefore I can evaluate the eﬀect of each of these measures of competition on relative
changes in returns to skill but not the contribution of all changes in competition to increased
wage inequality. Since the cleanest results correspond to the experiments, I focus on these. In
my sample, the ratio of wages of high to low skilled workers increased by 0.28 log points.
The direct eﬀect of the SMP on relative wages was to raise by 0.018 the gap between high
and low skilled workers. Taking into account the fact that 41% of the labor force was aﬀected
by the program, this implies a change in returns to skill of 0.0074 log points, i.e. 2.6% of
the measured increase in the skill gap since 1982. The eﬀect of the 1996 appreciation yields
a diﬀerence of 0.02 log points at average import penetration which is 7% of the total increase
in the skill gap. These are all non-negligible eﬀects that almost represent 10% of the observed
increase in the diﬀerential between high and low skill workers since 1982 (27% since 1990).
Competition has increased through many other sources and therefore this estimate is a lower
bound of the contribution of competition to returns to skill. The size of the overall eﬀect may
be much larger.
5 Conclusion
This paper identified product market competition as a source of increased returns to skill.
The proposed mechanism that feeds back from changes in competition in goods and services
markets to changes in the wage structure is the following. As competition increases, profits
are more sensitive to cost reductions and since high skilled workers are better at producing at
low costs firms will be willing to pay them higher wages relative to low skilled workers. This
will generate increased wage diﬀerentials. I developed a stylized model of that mechanism
that relied on two basic assumptions: that (at least some) product markets are imperfectly
competitive and that workers are heterogeneous. Other mechanisms that may relate product
market competition to returns to skill were discussed and assessed empirically.
I tested the hypothesis that skills are more highly rewarded (in relative terms) in highly
competitive industries. Using an individual panel of UK male workers in the manufacturing
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sector for the period 1982-1999 the hypothesis was confirmed using concentration ratios as a
measure of competition. The data used are particularly well-suited for this analysis. Results
indicated that competition raised returns to observed skill (in panel regressions) and also to
unobserved skills and ability (in quantile regressions). Then, in order to address criticisms to
using concentration measures as a measure of competition, I used two diﬀerent quasi-natural
experiments that improved on the identification of the true causal eﬀect of competition. The
first quasi-natural experiment exploited the large appreciation of the British pound in 1996
that implied a higher increase in competition for sectors with a high openness to trade. The
second was the introduction of the European Single Market program in 1992 that developed the
European internal market by reducing a number of entry barriers. I exploited the diﬀerential
eﬀect this had on sectors with diﬀerent degrees of non-tariﬀ barriers prior to 1992. The eﬀect
of these experiments on returns to skill was identified in a diﬀerence in diﬀerences specification.
Quantile regressions also indicated that returns to unobserved skills and ability went up.
Overall, the results indicated quite clearly that higher competition leads to higher returns
to both observed and unobserved skills. The eﬀect was present in sectors with high levels of
unionization and also in sectors with limited union presence indicating that although the causal
mechanism may be through changes in the degree of wage compression following the fall in
rents, the eﬀect was also present independently of that mechanism. Another important result
is that it is crucial to be able to account for individual eﬀects and the sorting of individuals
between sectors when computing returns to skill in this setting.
Therefore there is evidence for an explanation based on increasing product market competi-
tion for the observed trends in inequality over the past twenty years. This explanation coexists
with the traditionally studied skill biased technical change, institutional change etc. What
this study contributes is an explanation for a major component of the increase in inequality,
namely the large and largely unexplained increase in “within” sector and observed skill wage
diﬀerentials, as well as a theoretical justification that is consistent with the data.
This paper only constitutes a first attempt to establish the relationship between product
market competition and the wage structure. In the light of the evidence provided here there
seems to be a robust relationship between the two and further investigation to assess other
implications of those links is required. This avenue can yield interesting insights to understand
other aspects of wage diﬀerentials and it also calls for a study of the interaction between product
market competition on the one hand and de-unionization, technical change and organizational
change on the other as explanations of changes in the wage structure. These questions are left
for future research.
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6 Appendix
The general problem encountered when analyzing the diﬀerent models is that in my setting even
though firms are homogeneous ex ante, once they have hired a worker they are heterogeneous.
The models no longer have symmetric firms and this causes diﬃculties in obtaining closed
forms for the comparative statics. It is therefore convenient to work in terms of relative profits
and instead of proving single crossing in levels (as in equation 5) show that:
d2(eπ(di, θ)/eπ(dj , θ))
dθd(di)
< 0 (8)
Where dj can be any arbitrary chosen worker hired with dj < di.
Let’s assume now an explicit form of product market competition, namely horizontal
product diﬀerentiation in the market, of the Dixit-Stiglitz type. Denote by Yi the quant-
ity that firms produce in the final stage and that they will sell at a price pi. To produce they
use the worker employed in the first stage that can produce at costs di (that indicates the level
of (dis)ability). Monopolistic competition25 (Dixit Stiglitz, 1977) implies that
Yi = (
pi
p
)−θ ∗ Y
where Y and p are index functions and θ > 1 (−θ is the elasticity of substitution between
products)
Firms maximize gross profits (gross of wages) that are a function of di
Max
pi
π(di) = (pi − di) ∗ Yi
π(di) = Y pθ(p
1−θ
i − dip−θi )
First order condition yields pi = θdiθ−1 . Hence
eπ(di) = Y (p/θ)θ(di/(θ − 1))1−θ
Which is decreasing in di. The next step is to show how revenues change with θ. The
problem is that as θ changes the index functions Y and p also change and it is not simple to
solve analytically for the comparative statics. Thus I focus on how the ratio of profits between
firms hiring high and low skilled workers changes as competition changes. Take two workers i
and j such that di > dj (take j to be the more able worker).eπ(di)eπ(dj) = Y (p/θ)θ(di/(θ − 1))1−θY (p/θ)θ(dj/(θ − 1))1−θ = (didj )1−θ
d(eπ(di, θ)/eπ(dj , θ))
d(di)
= (1− θ)d−θi dθ−1j
25Where consumers have CES demand functions and there are N diﬀerentiated goods in the economy.
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Now it is easy to see that the condition on the slope of the wage function for changes in θ
is satisfied:
d2(eπ(di, θ)/eπ(dj , θ))
dθd(di)
= d−1j [−(
dj
di
)θ + (
dj
di
)θ(ln
dj
di
− θ ln dj
di
)]
This is negative, which proves condition (8). The result above applies for any given number
of firms (one may not want to assume free entry).
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7 Tables and Figures
7.1 Tables
Table 1: Skill groups in the NES
Skill level Major groups SOC code (minor gr.)
High Managers and administrators 10,11,12,15,19
(excl. oﬃce manag. and manag./prop. in agric.&services)
Professional occupations 20-27,29
Medium Oﬃce managers and manag./propietors in agric. and services 13,14,16,17
Associate professional and technician occupations 30-39
Craft and relations occupations 50-59
Buyers, brokers, sales representatives
Low Clerical, secretarial occupations 40-46,49
Personal and protective services occupations 60-67,69
Sales occupations (except buyers, browkers, sales reps) 72,73,79
Plant and machine operatives 80-89
Other occupations in agriculture, forestry, fishing 90
Other elementary occupations 91-95,99
Source: Based on Elias (1995)
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
All skill groups Low skill Med skill High skill
log real hourly wages 1.480 (0.446) 1.310 (0.344) 1.466 (0.397) 1.921 (0.478)
real hourly wages 4.910 (3.04) 3.936 (1.437) 4.709 (2.428) 7.729 (4.887)
age 39.30 (12.41) 39.213 (12.86) 38.46 (12.44) 41.42 (10.92)
age squared 1698.6 (1004.5) 1703.1 (1039.9) 1633.(7 995.9) 1834.9 (919.2)
tenure 4.874 (4.165) 4.866 (4.172) 4.964 (995.9) 4.69 (3.98)
tenure squared 41.10 (69.7) 41.08 (69.92) 42.54 (71.57) 37.9 (64.8)
low skilled 0.426 1 0 0
medium skilled 0.398 0 1 0
high skilled 0.176 0 0 1
CR5 output 0.248 (0.194) 0.242 (0.188) 0.244 (0.196) 0.271 (0.200)
CR5 employment 0.230 (0.187) 0.229 (0.186) 0.225 (0.188) 0.244 (0.185)
Import penetration 0.238 (0.141)
Observations 449551 191597 178822 79111
Notes: Mean of variables for the whole sample and by skill group, standard deviation in parenthesis
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Table 3: Coeﬀ. of correl. between diﬀerent concentration measures and distributions
Correlations CR5 output CR5 employment
CR5 output 1
CR5 employment 0.928 1
Distributions 25th perc. Median 75th perc.
CR5 output 0.136 0.240 0.408
CR5 employment 0.133 0.244 0.405
Table 4: Eﬀect Competition on employment
lnEmployment lnEmployment lnEmployment
(1) (2) (3)
Concentration -0.388
(0.347)
Impenetr.*1996 -0.416
(0.128)***
SENSAFT -0.202
(0.044)***
Year dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes (SIC 92) yes (SIC 92) yes (SIC 80)
Observations 1687 789 1806
Notes: Std. errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1%
Based on NES employment, males in the manufacturing sector.
Dependent variable is ln(employment) by sector and year
Sample periods: (1) and (3) 1982-1999 (2) 1992-1999
Table 5: The eﬀect of the SMP experiment on concentration
CR top 5
SENSAFT -0.033* (0.019)
Year dummies (82/99) yes
Sector dummies yes
Observations 1698
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; std. errors clustered by sector
*significant at 10%
Dep. variable is concentration ratio
SENSAFT is the interaction dummy for sensitive*dummy for after92
Unit of observation is year-sector, regressions are unweighted
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Table 6: Eﬀect of concentration on returns to skill
Sector eﬀ.. Indiv. eﬀ. Sector and individual eﬀects With year return
All Sector stayers Firm stay.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 0.0632 0.0627 0.0619 0.0541 0.0393 0.0636
(0.0005)*** (0.0019)*** (0.0019)*** (0.0026)*** (0.0024)*** (0.0019)***
Tenure 0.0112 0.0095 0.0093 0.0059 0.0082 0.0089
(0.0005)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0003)***
Med. skill 0.1675 0.0453 0.0461 0.0323 0.0268 0.0192
(0.0035)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0037)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0045)***
High skill 0.5617 0.1491 0.149 0.1168 0.1046 -0.0066
(0.0068)*** (0.0047)*** (0.0046)*** (0.0057)*** (0.0061)*** -0.0059
CR top5 -0.0231 0.1016 -0.0987 -0.0951 0.0234 -0.077
-0.0277 (0.0086)*** (0.0212)*** (0.0239)*** (0.0082)*** (0.0209)***
CR top5*Med. skill -0.0534 -0.0378 -0.0387 -0.0259 -0.0108 -0.0299
(0.0124)*** (0.0075)*** (0.0074)*** (0.0101)*** -0.0088 (0.0078)***
CR top5*High skill -0.1421 -0.0995 -0.1004 -0.0696 -0.0375 -0.0513
(0.0198)*** (0.0144)*** (0.0143)*** (0.0181)*** (0.0139)*** (0.0112)***
Year eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes - yes yes
Indiv. Fixed eﬀ. - yes yes yes
Ind*sector eﬀects - - - yes -
Ind*firm eﬀects - - - - yes -
Year*skill - - - - - yes
Sector*skill - - - - - -
Observations 449562 449562 449562 449562 449562 449562
With sect. ret.
(7)
0.0635
(0.001)***
0.0089
(3.35)***
0.0499
(0.007)***
0.0392
(0.011)***
-0.0817
(0.021)***
-0.0367
(0.009)***
-0.0218
(0.012)*
yes
yes
yes
-
-
yes
yes
449562
Notes: Robust std errors in parentheses, clustered by sector and year;
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent variable: log real hourly wage. Sample: males in manufacturing sector 1982/1999, NES
Variables: CR5 is top5 concentr. ratio; Year*skill (Sector*skill) are fully interacted year (sector) and skill dummies
Ind*sector (Ind*firm) eﬀects are fully interacted individual and sector (firm) dummies; includes age and tenure squared.
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Table 7: Quantile regressions with top 5 concentration ratio, by skill groups and pooled
10th perc. 25th perc. 50th perc. 75th perc. 90th perc. Observations
Low Skill sample:
CR top5 -0.001 0.0003 7.5E-06 -0.022 -0.125*** 191624
(0.023) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.027)
Medium Skill sample:
CR top5 -0.071*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.088*** -0.119*** 178825
(0.024) (0.0192) (0.019) (0.022) (0.034)
High Skill sample:
CR top5 -0.015 0.015 -0.011 -0.048 -0.109** 79113
(0.042) (0.034) (0.033) (0.040) (0.054)
All skills (full sample):
CR top5 -0.049*** -0.062*** -0.064*** -0.11*** -0.144*** 449562
(0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.020)
Notes: Std errors in parentheses, ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent variable log real hourly wage, Sample: males in manufacturing sector 1982/1999, NES
Variables: CR5 is top5 concentr. ratio; All regressions include age, tenure, their squares, sector and skill dummies.
Table 8: Goods Trade Balance
Exports Imports Balance
Periods
1992 107863 120913 -13050
1993 122229 135295 -13066
1994 135143 146269 -11126
1995 153577 165600 -12023
1996 167196 180918 -13722
1997 171923 184265 -12342
1998 164056 185869 -21813
1999 166166 195217 -29051
2000 187936 220912 -32976
Source: UK Oﬃce of National Statistics
Notes: Monetary variables in real terms, (base 1987)
In million UK pounds.
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Table 9: Exchange rate experiment: 1996 appreciation, All sectors
Diﬀerence estimates Diﬀerence in Diﬀerences
All Sector stayers All, no indiv.eﬀ. All Sector stayers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Imp.*p96 -0.0145 -0.0336 0.0423 -0.0076 -0.0058
(0.0230) (0.0169)** (0.0445) (0.0214) (0.0272)
Med. Skill*Imp.*p96 0.0610 0.0578 -0.0540 0.0283 0.0261
(0.0192)*** (0.0117)*** (0.0507) (0.0267) (0.0370)
High. Skill*Imp.*p96 0.1444 0.1733 -0.0879 0.0902 0.1022
(0.0274)*** (0.0152)*** (0.0765) (0.0417)** (0.0519)**
Med. Skill*p96 0.0212 0.0089 0.0058
(0.0154) (0.0075) (0.0102)
High skill*p96 0.0506 0.0289 0.0138
(0.0186)*** (0.0122)** (0.0144)
Med. Skill*Imp. 0.0985 0.0167 0.0336
(0.0830) (0.0237) (0.0591)
High. Skill*Imp 0.0744 -0.0316 -0.0514
(0.1007) (0.0384) (0.0951)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Indiv. fixed eﬀ. yes - yes
Ind*sector eﬀects - yes - - yes
Observations 64984 174135 174135 174135 174135
Notes: Robust std errors in parentheses, clustered by sector and year;
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent variable: log real hourly wage, Sample: males in manufacturing sector 1992/1999, NES
Variables: p96 is a dummy that takes value one after 1996, zero before; Imp. is mean import penetration in 1992/1995
All regressions include tenure, age and their squares.
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Table 10: Exchange rate experiment, accounting for trade unions
Full Sample Low unionization sample
Diﬀ. estimate Diﬀ in Diﬀ Diﬀ. estimate Diﬀ in Diﬀ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Imp.*p96 -0.0293 -0.0075 0.1084 0.1473
(0.0164)* (0.0212) (0.0432)** (0.0697)**
Med. Skill*Imp.*p96 0.0476 0.0145 -0.0063 -0.1169
(0.0114)*** (0.0254) (0.0286) (0.0936)
High Skill*Imp.*p96 0.1414 0.0904 0.0512 0.1073
(0.0155)*** (0.0477)* (0.0173)*** (0.0509)**
Union 0.0591 0.0581
(0.0318)* (0.0321)*
Med. Skill*Union -0.0310 -0.0313
(0.0218) (0.0223)
High Skill*Union -0.1019 -0.0933
(0.0307)*** (0.0322)***
Med. Skillp96 0.0096 0.037
(0.0073) (0.0393)
High Skill*p96 0.0177 -0.028
(0.0140) (0.0214)
Med. Skill*Imp. 0.0298 0.262
(0.0261) (0.1016)***
High Skill*Imp. -0.0092 -0.0505
(0.0379) (0.166)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes
Indiv. Fixed eﬀ. yes yes yes yes
Observations 127675 127675 6567 6567
Notes: Robust std errors in parentheses, clustered by sector and year;
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent variable: log real hourly wage,
Sample: males in manufacturing sector 1992/1999 in columns (3) and (4) 94/99 in columns (1) and (2)
Low unionisation sample are sectors with less that 10% union density in 1994
Variables: p96 is a dummy that takes value one after 1996, zero before; Imp. is mean import penetration in 92/95
Union is level of union density in the sector, available from 1994; All regressions Include tenure, age and their squares;
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Table 11: European Single Market Program experiment, 1992
Diﬀerence estimate Diﬀerence in Diﬀerences
All Sector stayers All Sector stayers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SENSAFT -0.0112 -0.0107 0.0112 0.0083
[0.0096] [0.0112] [0.0086] [0.0105]
Med. skill*SENSAFT 0.0207 0.019 -0.004 -0.0025
[0.0055]*** [0.0065]*** [0.0059] [0.0073]
High skill*SENSAFT 0.0974 0.0808 0.0184 0.0179
[0.0084]*** [0.0113]*** [0.0106]* [0.0128]
Med. skill*sensitive -0.0002 0.0043
[0.0043] [0.0063]
High skill*sensitive -0.0179 -0.013
[0.0085]** [0.0117]
Med. skill*after92 0.0345 0.0274
[0.0040]*** [0.0047]***
High skill*after92 0.1216 0.0926
[0.0085]*** [0.0091]***
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes
Indiv. fixed eﬀ. yes yes
Indiv*sector eﬀ. - yes - yes
Observations 415306 415306 415306 415306
Notes: Robust std. errors in parentheses, clustered by sector
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent variable: log real hourly wage, sample are males in manufacturing sector 1982/1999
Variables: sensitive is a dummy that takes value one for sectors that were classified as having high non-tariﬀ barriers;
after92 is a dummy that takes value 1 after 1992; SENSAFT is the interaction betw. sensitive and after92
Regressions also include skill dummies and tenure, age and their squares.
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Table 12: SMP experiment and unions
Low unionization sample
Diﬀerence Diﬀerence in Diﬀerences
(1) (2)
SENSAFT 0.0487 0.0575
(0.0174)*** (0.015)***
Med. skill*SENSAFT 0.0381 0.0286
(0.0124)*** (0.0088)***
High skill*SENSAFT 0.053 0.0042
(0.053)*** (0.0159)
Med. skill*sensitive -0.0055
(0.0171)
High skill*sensitive -0.0317
(0.0388)
Med. skill*after92 0.0176
(0.0113)
High skill*after92 0.0749
(0.0183)***
Year dummies yes yes
Sectors dummies yes yes
Individual fixed eﬀ. yes yes
Observations 20062 20062
Notes: Robust std. errors in parentheses, clustered by sector
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent variable: log real hourly wage. Sample: males in manufacturing sector 1982/1999, NES
Low unionization sample are sectors with less that 10% union density in 1994
Variables: sensitive is a dummy that takes value one for sectors that were classified as having high non-tariﬀ barriers;
after92 is a dummy that takes value 1 after 1992, zero before; SENSAFT is the interaction betw. sensitive and after92
Regressions also include skill dummies and tenure, age and their squares.
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Table 13: Quantile regressions with SMP experiment
10th perc. 25th perc. 50th perc. 75th perc. 90th perc. Observations
Low Skill:
SENSAFT -0.005 0.007** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.011* 176664
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Medium Skill:
SENSAFT -0.003 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.014** 165196
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.067)
High Skill:
SENSAFT -0.003 -0.006 0.007 0.019** 0.030*** 73445
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.111)
All Skills:
SENSAFT 0.003 0.015*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.035*** 449562
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
All skills low union:
SENSAFT -0.011 0.007 0.033* 0.056** 0.051* 20062
0.021 0.016 0.018 0.020 0.029
Notes: std errors in parentheses;
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent variable: log real hourly wage. Sample: males in manufacturing sector 1982/1999
SENSAFT is the interaction betw. dummy for sensitive and dummy for after92
Regressions include quadratics in tenure and age, year and sector dummies
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7.2 Figures
Figure 3: High to low skill wage diﬀerential in the manufacturing sector 1982-1999
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Figure 4: Employment and output concentration ratios for the UK manufacturing sector
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Figure 5: Between sector correlation CR5 employment and wage dispersion
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Figure 6: Time series correlation between CR5 employment and wage dispersion
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Figure 7: Eﬀective exchange rate, Pound Sterling (1990=100)
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